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Abstract
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Celebrations of playing through risk, skepticism of athletes perceived as faking injuries, unregulated training regimens, the mythos of amateurism, and lack of accountability for preventable health harms have long characterized many college football programs. Setting policies that effectively prioritize player health will require taking this history into account.
In the early 1930s, the American Football Coaches Association (AFCA) was closely tracking public alarm over the hazards of college football. Calls for reform grew particularly loud following the death of Richard Brinsley Sheridan, Jr. in 1931. In the fourth quarter of that year's Army-Yale football game, the young cadet sustained a broken neck while making a tackle. He never regained consciousness and died several days later. 1 Dr. Mal Stevens, then-president of the AFCA, warned attendees at the association's annual meeting that "all the furore" would adversely affect recruitment efforts: "we can anticipate that a lot of mothers are not going to let their sons play football." 2 The public might begin to perceive the sport as unacceptably dangerous.
In response, Stevens announced that the AFCA would initiate a survey of injuries and fatalities. 3 He also co-authored a 1933 text, The Control of Football Injuries, to directly address safety concerns. Reviewers at the time noted that this work "grew out of the criticism of the game of football and its associated injuries." 4 Alongside its specific health guidance, ranging from best dietary practices to how to set up a locker room, The Control of Football Injuries also reveals deep-seated beliefs about player safety. These included the conviction that some players were prone to fake injuries, and that a stoic approach was appropriate for minor or commonplace injuries that were presumably of little consequence...
Language: en |